Judicial Review and Co-operative Federalism

I would like to return to Justice Blanchard’s reasons for judgment granting the injunction preventing destruction of Québec-related gun-registry data pending judgment on the merits in this case, about which I posted here a couple of days ago.

The case, says Justice Blanchard, is “exceptional,” “a first in Canadian judicial history” (par. 21). The reason it is exceptional is the opposition between the “diametrically opposed views of what is usually called the common good.” I think this is wrong. While the conflict between the federal and a provincial governments’ views of the common good might be especially clear in the gun-registry data litigation, there is nothing exceptional about it. Most federalism cases, certainly all cases that pit a province against the federal government, involve a similar conflict between views of the common good. For example, the federal government thinks that the common good requires a national securities regulator; Québec and Alberta think that it is best served by provincial regulators. The result is a court case. When the two levels of governments agree on a vision of the common good, the co-operate and don’t go to court, the constitution be damned. Healthcare is the prime example: neither s. 91 nor any other provision of the Constitution Act, 1867 give Parliament any role regulating and paying for healthcare, but it does both, because (and perhaps only so long as) the provinces share its view of the public good in this area, and have no inclination to challenge it in court.

What is in fact (almost) unique in the gun-registry litigation is that, as I argued in my first comments on the topic, it actually stems from a co-operative relationship – but one that has broken down. “Normal” federalism cases involve conflicts over who has the power to decide whether and how to regulate certain areas of human activity. Who, of Parliament and provincial legislatures, for example, has the power to decide (whether and) how the securities industry should go about its business. (Not, by the way, who should have this power, as a matter of economic policy; but who actually has it under the specific constitutional arrangements we have in place.) In these cases, courts are called upon to regulate the competitive aspects of federal-provincial relations. The gun-registry litigation is different because what it really is about is not competition for the power to regulate (indeed it is acknowledged that, on the one hand, Parliament has the power not to regulate gun registration if it does not want to, and provincial legislatures have the power to regulate gun registration if they feel like it); it is about “fair terms of co-operation” between the two levels of government, to borrow a phrase from John Rawls (who of course uses it in a different context).

Courts are not often called upon to police the fairness of the terms of co-operation between the federation and its constituent units, and it seems not to be sufficiently theorized. For example, critics of federalism-based judicial review (who are many in the United States, including for example Larry D. Kramer in this article) do not pay any attention to it; Jeremy Waldron’s criticism of judicial review, which is primarily (but not exclusively) directed to rights-based judicial review, is similarly incapable of addressing it. (Some judicial and academic attention in the United States has been directed at one specific problem which arises from co-operative federalism: the tendency of the federal government to attach stringent conditions to grants of funds to sub-federal units, which the Supreme Court of the U.S. addressed in South Dakota v. Dole and will address again in ruling on the constitutionality of “Obamacare.”) Yet judicial review of the fair terms of federal co-operation deserves attention as a distinct constitutional phenomenon. To give but one example, and return, in conclusion, to the gun-registry litigation, Justice Blanchard’s incredulity at the idea of an award of damages as a remedy in a federalism dispute would probably be appropriate if the dispute were, as usual, about competitive federalism; but it might be unfounded in a dispute about the fair terms of federal co-operation.

More on the Gun-Registry Litigation

Having sought – and obtained – cheap popularity with my potty-mouthed post yesterday, I now return to the (extra)ordinary world of constitutional law, and to my favourite topic so far: Québec’s attempt to gets its hands on the gun-registry data the federal government wants to destroy.

I just came across – a bit late – on the reasons for the decision of Justice Marc-André Blanchard, granting Québec’s motion for an interlocutory injunction to stay the application of the federal legislation requiring the destruction of the gun-registry data, about which I posted here and here.

The most important thing in the decision that I, at any rate, had missed in the media reports is that the injunction Blanchard J. granted not only prevents the destruction of existing gun-registry data but also requires that new data continue to be compiled, as if the registry were not abolished, at least until the trial. Québec is not challenging the power of Parliament to put an end to data collection in its merits claims; it only seeks the preservation of the status quo pending the outcome of this litigation and the possible establishment of Québec’s own gun-registry using the federal data. Blanchard J. agrees that, in case Québec succeeds in obtaining the federal government’s gun-registry data, it would make no sense to leave a gap in the data between the moment the federal government stops collecting data and Québec’s own registry is put in place, which cannot possibly be done right away.

I will note two other things. First, Blanchard J. insists on the fact that this case is an important ways novel and exceptional, especially because it results from conflicting interpretations of the public good advanced by two legislatures, both of them democratically legitimate. I think I hinted at this problem, though not exactly in the way Blanchard J. does, in the second of my observations on Québec’s claim.

And second, the federal government argued that the injunction should not issue because Québec’s harm was not irreparable since any expenses involved in re-collecting unconstitutionally destroyed data could be compensated by an award of damages. Blanchard J. rejected this claim on the basis that “it appears not unreasonable to assert that a monetary remedy in a constitutional controversy concerned with division of powers … seems bizarre” (par. 60; translation mine). Now I’m not at all convinced that this is right in the present case, which is, as the judge points out, highly unusual. But what I find really interesting is that it is none other than the federal government who seems to answer in the affirmative the question I raised on this blog: could a province recover damages for the federal government’s destruction of the gun-registry data, if that is found to be unconstitutional? I’m pretty proud I saw that one, although I still have doubts about the possibility of such a claim, and I suspect that if one were brought, the federal government’s lawyers would have doubts too.

Laïcité: le diable dans les détails

On a beau défendre la laïcité, le diable reste dans les détails. Un entretien de Radio-Canada sur le sujet de la laïcité avec un philosophe français, Henri Peña-Ruiz, est une bonne occasion pour nous le rappeler.

M. Peña-Ruiz soutient que la laïcité n’est pas hostile à la religion. Elle insiste plutôt pour s’assurer que “la religion n’engage que les croyants.” D’où l’importance de la garder séparée de l’État qui, lui, engage tout le monde. La laïcité exige une “stricte égalité” de traitement entre croyants et non-croyants. Donc “pas de privilèges, pas de droits spéciaux,” pas d’ “accomodements avec les religions.” Les traditions historiques ou culturelles, qu’on invoque pour défendre la persistence du religieux dans l’espace public ne sont pas de bonnes justifications. Il faut rompre avec le passé et les inégalités, l’oppression qui l’ont caracrtérisé. La place de la religion est donc dans la sphère privée. Si vous priez dans l’intimité de votre maison ou lieu de culte, c’est votre affaire. La sphère publique, quant à elle, doit être indépendente de la religion, de toute religion, de toutes les religions. Le principe de laïcité pourrait faire consensus si on admettait la stricte égalité de traitement.

Ces idées sont, j’ai l’impression, plutôt populaires non seulement en France, mais aussi au Québec. Or, elles sont, au mieux, simplistes, sinon délibérément trompeuses. À écouter M. Peña-Ruiz, on pourrait être porté à croire que la séparation entre le public/laïc et le privé/religieux-pour-qui-le veut est claire et plutôt simple à réaliser. Il n’en est rien. Le slogan “pas de privilèges, pas de droits spéciaux” n’a de sens que si on s’entend sur le sens des concepts de privilège ou de droit spécial, qui sont, en réalité, sujets à controverse.

Pour exiger la séparation entre le public et le privé afin de cantonner le religieux dans l’espace privé, il faut commencer par se faire une idée de ce qui est public et ce qui est privé. Ce n’est pas si simple, comme le démontre la persistance de certaines controverses bien connues. L’habillement d’un employé de l’État, est-ce public ou privé? Et celui d’un élève d’une école publique? Et ce que cet élève porte sous ses vêtements? Privé, dites-vous? Et si c’est un kirpan? À qui revient de définir le public et le privé? Et selon quels critères? Est-ce l’intention qui compte (le crucifix à l’Assemblée nationale se veut un symbole historique et non religieux; un kirpan, un symbole religieux et non une arme)? Ou est-ce plutôt quelque critère objectif? Mais qui est objectif dans ces débats?

Et que signifie le refus d’octroyer des faveurs aux religions? Quand une règle apparemment neutre a un effet disproportionné sur les adeptes d’une religion particulière (comme les règles sur l’abattage d’animaux ont sur les Juifs et les Musulmans), est-ce favoriser leur religion que de les exempter de son application, ou est-ce plutôt rétablir une égalité que la règle rompt? Ça dépend de notre définition d’égalité, et bien sûr, c’est un sujet d’intenses débats, pas seulement dans le contexte du traitement réservé aux religions. Quand l’État finance les écoles religieuses (qui dispensent aussi les cours requis par le gouvernement) comme il finance, aux mêmes conditions, les écoles privées laïques, favorise-t-il la religion en rendant l’éducation religieuse plus accessible ou ne fait-il que traiter équitablement les groupes privés peu importe leur appartenance religieuse? La encore, on peut donner différentes réponses à la question.

Je pourrais continuer longtemps – mon mémoire de maîtrise porte justement sur la question d’exemptions, et il fait plus de 40 pages à interligne simple. Mais dans ce billet, je veux simplement insister sur le fait que la simplicité des thèses qu’on lance souvent en parlant de laïcité est trompeuse, qu’elle cache beaucoup de questions difficiles, et qu’elle peut servir d’outil rhétorique pour masquer la mauvaise foi trop souvent présente dans ces débats. On peut vouloir sortir Dieu de l’espace public, mais il faut se rendre compte qu’on ne saurait sortir le diable des détails.

Are Provincial Election Spending Restrictions Ultra Vires?

Here’s a simple, crazy question: is legislation limiting electoral campaign expenses unconstitutional because ultra vires the provinces? I think that the argument in support of an affirmative answer makes sense, even though I wouldn’t expect Canadian courts to buy it. Here it is.

Campaign spending restrictions restrict free speech on political matters. Nobody disputes that, and the Supreme Court recognizes this in cases such Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569. Nonetheless, such laws (if not too restrictive – as the law in Libman was found to be) can be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and are therefore constitutional. Or are they?

In the “implied bill of rights” cases, starting with the Alberta Statutes Reference, [1938] R.C.S. 100, the Supreme Court pushed back against attempts by the provinces (first Alberta and then Québec) to curtail political speech disagreeable to authoritarian provincial governments. As there was no Charter then, it used the federal division of powers to ground its judgments. Speech, especially political speech, was said to be within the exclusive competence of Parliament, outside the reach of provincial legislation. Whatever its subject, it was not of merely provincial importance. In the words of Chief Justice Duff and Justice Davis in the Alberta Statutes Reference, at p. 134,

[a]ny attempt to abrogate this right of public debate or to suppress the traditional forms of the exercise of the right (in public meeting and through the press) would, in our opinion, be incompetent to the legislatures of the provinces, or to the legislature of any one of the provinces, as repugnant to the provisions of The British North America Act, by which the Parliament of Canada is established as the legislative organ of the people of Canada under the Crown, and Dominion legislation enacted pursuant to the legisla­tive authority given by those provisions. The subject matter of such legislation could not be described as a pro­vincial matter purely; as in substance exclusively a matter of property and civil rights within the province, or a matter private or local within the province.

Saumur v. City of Québec [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 and Switzman v. Elbing [1957] S.C.R. 285 are to the same effect.

Overruling such hallowed precedents, showing the Supreme Court’s commitment to individual rights even in the absence of explicit constitutional authorization, seems unthinkable.

Can they be distinguished? One might argue that regulation of provincial elections, as opposed to political speech generally, is a different subject, competent to the provinces. I think the distinction fails. The passage I quote above does not really leave room for it. Provincial politics and federal politics are obviously connected, so if federal political discussion is to be free, so must provincial political discussion. But there is another possibility. It is at least a somewhat plausible reading of the “implied bill of rights” cases that what they prohibit is not any regulation of political speech by the provinces, but only, to use an American term, “viewpoint restrictions.” A province can regulate speech; it just cannot single out one opinion for unfavourable treatment. And it is perhaps arguable, though I believe (for reasons I have no room to elaborate here but touch on in my Cyberpresse op-ed) not correct, that campaign spending restrictions are viewpoint neutral. If that argument fails, as I think it should, then provincial restrictions on election spending are ultra vires and thus unconstitutional.

Quasi-Constitutional Rights?

What are “quasi-constitutional rights”? Is this a meaningful, a useful concept? Justice Lebel’s comments in a decision released last week by the Supreme Court raise the question.

The decision, Éditions Écosociété Inc. v. Banro Corp., 2012 SCC 18 is one of three released last Wednesday, all dealing with questions of when Canadian courts can, and when they should, assume jurisdiction over a tort action with multi-jurisdictional elements. In this case, the action was in defamation. The appellants were the publishers of a book savaging Canadian mining companies for their activities (allegedly involving massive human rights violations) in Africa. The respondents were one of these companies. The book was published in Québec, but over 90 copies were sold in Ontario, some to public libraries, and the book was promoted there. The respondents are based in Ontario, and sued for defamation there. The publishers tried to have the proceedings stayed either for lack of jurisdiction or because the Ontario court was a forum non conveniens; they argued that the respondents were engaging in libel tourism, suing for defamation in jurisdiction more favourable to plaintiffs than that in which the suit should logically have been brought (in this case, Québec). Their motion was dismissed, and their appeals rejected both by the Ontario Court of Appeal and now by the Supreme Court.

In discussing the issue of the choice of law in defamation actions, Justice Lebel wrote (for the unanimous court)

that the harm occasioned by the publication of a defamatory statement is not the publication itself, but rather injury to the plaintiff’s reputation. While the constitutional right to the protection of freedom of expression must be upheld in the crafting of the law of defamation, this Court has recognized that one of the primary purposes of the law of defamation is to protect the reputation of the individual, which was elevated to quasi-constitutional status in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. [par. 57]

As those of you who read my lament about the Charter’s unfortunate effects will recall, I am not a fan of Justice Cory’s reasoning in Hill, linking reputation to innate dignity and privacy, which I called “grasping at constitutional straws.” At least, Justice Cory did not actually speak of a “quasi-constitutional status” for the right to reputation. Justice Lebel now does. What does that mean? Continue reading “Quasi-Constitutional Rights?”

Another Gun-Registry Litigation Update

Radio-Canada reports that the safeguard order preventing the destruction of Québec-related gun registry data has been extended until the end of the hearing on the merits in June. I thought that this had already been the case, but I suppose that the previous extension was only good until the issuance of today’s opinion.

Legal and Political Questions about Student Protests

Faced with the lengthening strikes and the prospect of losing their semester – and thus having their graduation and their entry on the job market delayed – students at many of Québec’s CÉGEPs and universities have turned to the courts and have been seeking, and obtaining, injunctions forcing the schools to get back to teaching the courses they are registered for. The injunctions tend to prevent the student “strikers” from blocking entry to their schools and otherwise disrupting classes. The injunction obtained by a student in a technical programme at the CÉGEP de Saint-Laurent is, I understand, fairly typical. Other injunctions, aiming directly at student protesters, have been obtained by universities.

The law, explained for example in the CÉGEP de Saint-Laurent decision, is quite clear. Student associations do not have the same status as trade unions. They are not entitled to impose their “strike” votes on their members, as trade unions are. Students contract for education services, and pay, however little. They are entitled to have the classes they contract and pay for. They suffer great prejudice if they lose their semester. The protesters, on the other hand, can still protest if they feel like it, despite the injunctions.

Yet the courts’ stepping in to apply the law and grant these injunctions has produced an outcry, including from lawyers. The argument is that what’s going on is a “judicialization” of a social conflict; that the courts are improperly stepping in to resolve political questions. This is the issue I want to address today. What is the distinction between legal and political questions? And is a wrongful “judicialization” affecting the student protests in Québec? Continue reading “Legal and Political Questions about Student Protests”