Last summer, I wrote a blog post about a concerning case out of the Federal Court, Girouard v CJC. The gist of the case was the claim by the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) that their reports, recommendations, and decisions in the course of the investigation of a judge were not subject to judicial review under the Federal Courts Act.
For the reasons I outlined in my blog post, this argument was both surprising and unfortunate:
I see this case as an extreme example of the modern trend of administrative law: towards more regulation and more administrative decision-makers that have court-imposed “unlimited” powers (see West Fraser, at para 11). Once we accept even one instance of such a decision-maker, vested by statute, we have to conclude that no court can speak ill of that “unlimited” decision-maker. Obviously this has profound effect on the Rule of Law, individual liberties, and due process. Take this case–dissenting members of the CJC were concerned that certain anglophone members of the CJC could not evaluate the entire record, which was in French. This implicates the fairness of the process for Justice Girouard. A purpose of judicial review is to ensure this basic fairness, but if we make administrative decision-makers beyond reproach, we sit them alongside the basic law of the land–the Constitution. And of course, legislative bodies acting alone cannot establish new constitutional provisions.
And, because of finer legal points, I thought that the CJC’s case was weak. For example, though the membership of the CJC is made up of s.96 judges, which would counsel a restrained approach to judicial review, the premise of the CJC is as a “statutory investigatory institution, vested with powers only so far as the statute allows.” The CJC is, like all administrative decision-makers, rooted in statute. And as a result, the membership of the CJC does not bear on the question of whether it is subject to review.
Luckily, the Federal Court of Appeal recently affirmed the Federal Court’s holding that the CJC is subject to judicial review. This is the right result, and one that prioritizes the rule of law—the supervision of all state actors, regardless of their status, under higher law—over administrative fiat, even fiat issued by judges.
It is worthwhile to explore the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasoning to see why the court got the case right. Under the Federal Courts Act, the definition of a federal board was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Mikisew Cree—a judgment to which Chief Justice Wagner, who is the head of the CJC, signed his name. Section 2 of the statute defines a reviewable “federal, board, commission or other tribunal” as one that exercises statutory powers or powers under an order made pursuant to Crown prerogative (Mikisew Cree, at para 18). Here, we see the idea that the root of agencies subject to judicial review in the Federal Courts is fundamentally statutory in character. On this front, the Court reviewed its test in Anisman, which provides that a court, to determine whether a body falls within the Federal Courts Act, must consider the source of the powers exercised and the nature of those powers (see para 37).
Consider first the source of power. Here, the Court—as I did in my blog post last summer—drew a sensible distinction between the CJC as a statutory institution and its membership. The Court noted that without statutory nourishment, the CJC would not exist—it exercises no inherent powers simply because it is made up of s.96 judges (see paras 41). Moreover, the nature of the powers exercised by the CJC are not judicial, adjudicative powers per se. Rather, the CJC exercises powers that are fundamentally administrative in nature; those powers are inquisitorial, investigative, and not powers exercised by s.96 judges as s.96 judges (see paras 77-78). Since both the source and nature of the powers exercised by the CJC are rooted and defined by statute, and are typical administrative powers, it follows that they can easily fit the definition of a federal board under the Federal Courts Act. On this front, it is important to note that the CJC could have been expressly excluded from this definition by Parliament, but it was not.
There was another argument raised by counsel for the CJC based on 63(4) of the Judges Act, which deems the Board or an inquiry panel a “superior court” (see para 81). It followed, according to counsel, that this deeming clause must be read in its ordinary meaning, such that it was at least colourable that the Board should have “all the attributes” of superior court jurisdiction; and therefore, should be excluded from the definition of a statutory body under the Federal Courts Act.
Notwithstanding that this argument runs up against the stubborn fact that the CJC exists only because of a statute saying so, the Court rejected this argument on other grounds. The text of the so-called deeming provision, notably, did not denote that the CJC’s jurisdiction should expand to the full powers of a superior court, beyond the procedural powers required to manage inquiries. Notably, if Parliament wanted the CJC to be a court of superior jurisdiction, it could create it as such under s.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, under which the Federal Court was created. But it did not do so. Absent a clearer statement, the CJC should not be presumed to possess full superior court powers, just as the Canada Transport Agency, with a similar deeming provision, is not presumed to carry those powers.
The final part of the judgment, which should be particularly commended, is the Court’s focus on the implications of the CJC’s arguments for the rule of law. Shielding the CJC from review would amount to a situation where an administrative decision-maker—simply because of some of its membership, and even though it exercises public functions—can evade the strictures of public law. In a government of laws, the possibility for this should be foreclosed. This is true no matter who makes up the overall administrative body.
Overall, there are two important points to this case to which I should draw attention. First, and as I have said time and time again, the administrative state exists not because of any constitutional mandate or legal principle other than statutory enactment. Judges attempting to insulate themselves from review could be successful if the administrative state existed as a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, there are some that argue that there are constitutional foundations to the administrative state. This sort of argument, in my view and with all due respect, is clearly wrong. And the Federal Court of Appeal seems to agree. Even when we are talking about judges, the fact that the CJC’s existence is because of statute is the definitive answer to any claim that it cannot be subject to the rule of law. Put differently, imagine the incentive effects of an opposite conclusion. Parliament could staff administrative agencies with judges, making them evasive of judicial review, and simply state that the Constitution protects the body of which they are members as part of the “constitutional administrative state.” No one should accept this line of reasoning.
Second, the fact that the court rooted its consideration in the rule of law is important. The Court could have simply analyzed the applicable law, which clearly ran up against the CJC’s claims. But it went further at para 103 by rooting the conclusion in the idea that all public officials—no matter their own august judicial status—should be subject to the dictates of law. In today’s day and age, this is a reminder that we all need.