textualism
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Interpretation and the Value of Law II
This post is written by Leonid Sirota and Mark Mancini. We read with interest Stéphane Sérafin, Kerry Sun, and Xavier Foccroulle Ménard’s reply to our earlier post on legal interpretation. In a nutshell, we argued that those who interpret legal texts such as constitutions or statutes should apply established legal techniques without regard for the Continue reading
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Against Pure Pragmatism in Statutory Interpretation III: A Way Forward and Walsh (ONCA)
About a month ago, I wrote two posts attacking the concept of “pragmatism” in Canadian statutory interpretation. So my argument goes, the seminal Rizzo case, while commonly said to herald a “purposive” approach to interpretation, is actually methodologically pragmatic This is because the famous paragraph from Rizzo, which contains a list of things an interpret Continue reading
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The Top Statutory Interpretation Cases of 2020
A banner year for interpretation Continue reading
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Textualism for Hedgehogs
Why substantive canons belong in textualist interpretation, and what this tells us about neutral interpretive principles Continue reading
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Neutrality in Legal Interpretation
Nowadays, it is unfashionable to say that legal rules, particularly rules of interpretation, should be “neutral.” Quite the opposite: now it is more fashionable to say that results in cases depend on the “politics” of a court on a particular day. Against this modern trend, not so long ago, it was Herbert Wechsler in his Continue reading
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Still Keeping It Complicated
The Supreme Court tries to bring more rigour to constitutional interpretation and takes a step towards textualism, but won’t admit it Continue reading
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You Read It Here First
The Supreme Court holds that the Charter does not protect corporations against cruel and unusual punishment Continue reading
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Linguistic Nihilism
One common line of attack against textualism—the idea that “the words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means (Scalia & Garner, at 56)—is that language is never clear, or put differently, hopelessly vague or ambiguous. Put this way, the task of interpretation Continue reading
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Just Hook It to My Veins
Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s excellent lecture on statutory and constitutional interpretation Continue reading
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On Canadian Statutory Interpretation and Recent Trends
I have had the pleasure of reading (for the first time front-to-back) the legal interpretation classic, Reading Law by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner. For Canadian courts struggling with how to source and use purpose when interpreting statutes, Reading Law provides valuable assistance. It does so by outlining two schools of thought on how to Continue reading
Double Aspect 